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defrogWhile we’re on ineffective ways to fight Teh Al Qaedas – the Patriot Act, massive data mines, etc – here’s another way Bush (and by extension, Obama) may have got it wrong – invading Afghanistan.
The justification, of course – apart from the widespread visceral belief right after 9/11 that someone had to be made an example out of and get their ass kicked, preferably someone without money or nukes – has always been that al Qaeda had training camps there, Osama bin Laden was hiding there and the Taliban wouldn’t let us look for him, so fuck ‘em, let’s overthrow the whole fucking country so al Qaeda won’t be able to hide.
Turns out that probably was for nothing, too.
For a start, al Qaeda left Afghanistan years ago. The fight there now is about keeping the Taliban from taking the country back and making it a terrorist haven again. However, according to Paul Pillar, deputy chief of the counterterrorist center at the CIA from 1997 to 1999, the role of terrorist training camps isn’t really all that big in al Qaeda’s operations these days:
Oops!
What are we fighting for,
This is dF
The justification, of course – apart from the widespread visceral belief right after 9/11 that someone had to be made an example out of and get their ass kicked, preferably someone without money or nukes – has always been that al Qaeda had training camps there, Osama bin Laden was hiding there and the Taliban wouldn’t let us look for him, so fuck ‘em, let’s overthrow the whole fucking country so al Qaeda won’t be able to hide.
Turns out that probably was for nothing, too.
For a start, al Qaeda left Afghanistan years ago. The fight there now is about keeping the Taliban from taking the country back and making it a terrorist haven again. However, according to Paul Pillar, deputy chief of the counterterrorist center at the CIA from 1997 to 1999, the role of terrorist training camps isn’t really all that big in al Qaeda’s operations these days:
Consider: The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.
In the past couple of decades, international terrorist groups have thrived by exploiting globalization and information technology, which has lessened their dependence on physical havens.
By utilizing networks such as the Internet, terrorists' organizations have become more network-like, not beholden to any one headquarters. A significant jihadist terrorist threat to the United States persists, but that does not mean it will consist of attacks instigated and commanded from a South Asian haven, or that it will require a haven at all. Al-Qaeda's role in that threat is now less one of commander than of ideological lodestar, and for that role a haven is almost meaningless.
In the past couple of decades, international terrorist groups have thrived by exploiting globalization and information technology, which has lessened their dependence on physical havens.
By utilizing networks such as the Internet, terrorists' organizations have become more network-like, not beholden to any one headquarters. A significant jihadist terrorist threat to the United States persists, but that does not mean it will consist of attacks instigated and commanded from a South Asian haven, or that it will require a haven at all. Al-Qaeda's role in that threat is now less one of commander than of ideological lodestar, and for that role a haven is almost meaningless.
Oops!
What are we fighting for,
This is dF
